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Structural modernization has changed and diminished the authority that the 
traditional churches had in the culture and politics of pre-Enlightenment Euro-
pean societies. Since the Age of Enlightenment, modernization in Europe 
followed multiple paths and culminated with the paradigmatic confrontation 
between Capitalist democracies and collective Communist regimes during the 
Cold War.  
This dissertation asks the following questions: “In comparison to Western 
democracies, what specific impact did the atheist Communist regimes have on 
the social authority of the traditional churches? To what extent did the Com-
munist regimes have a different or similar influence on the emergence of 
modern forms of religion in society, culture and politics that have changed the 
traditional public functions and authority of church institutions?” 
Five studies assess these research questions in detail (Table 1) by using the 
historical approach (Table 2) and the comparative method (Table 3). The main 
empirical focus is on the Western-Christian post-communist societies (I, IV).  
 
 
Table 1. Research focus in five studies 
Study Research focus 
 Type of religion  Public function of religion  
I  Traditional church institution Social authority 
II Traditional church institution; 
modern forms of national, cultural and 
civilizational religion 
Political legitimization of the 
social order 
III Traditional church institution; 
modern forms of national, cultural, and 
civil religion; and  deinstitutionalized and 
individualized religiosity 
Political culture and national 
identity (regional patterns) 
IV Traditional church institution; 
modern forms of individualized and 
deinstitutionalized religiosity 
Political culture and national 
identity (social patterns) 
V Traditional church institution; 
modern forms of national, cultural, and 
civil religion 
Political culture and national 
identity (case study of Estonia) 
 
 
The research focus is limited to the types and the extent to which the traditional 
church institutions have retained their social, cultural and political authority. In 
traditional societies, the traditional church institutions were the sole institutional 
representatives of religion in society, culture and politics. Accordingly, their 
status, authority and functions in the public sphere have changed and declined 
in three main aspects. First, the traditional church institutions abandon their 
status and authority, and act in public sphere as denominations, interest or 
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pressure groups. Second, lay members occupying political offices and repre-
senting secular institutions (such as political parties) interpret religious tradition 
in the public sphere. Third, to the extent that modern religion has become auto-
nomous from the traditional religious institutions (Bellah 1964:372; Burdziej 
2005:167), the religion in the public sphere (such as civil religion) has also lost 
its connections to traditional church institutions. 
The historical analysis starts from the symbolical year 380, when Christia-
nity transformed from a private, associational and sub-cultural reality into a 
public, social, political and cultural reality (I, 198). In 380, the edict of em-
perors Gratian, Valentinian II and Theodosius I established Catholicism as the 
state religion and demanded the acknowledgment of the true doctrine of the 
Trinity as the test of political loyalty (Ehler, Morall 1967: 6–7). This trans-
formation resulted in the social sacralization of Christianity, in the Christia-
nization of society, culture and politics, and in the ontological change of 
Christianity (II, 83). Similarly, each new type of Christianization of political 
communities and cultures – such as confessionalization (Gorski 2003) and 
cultural nationalization (II, 84–85) – also involved a new kind of politicization 
of Christianity, and resulted in a new symbiosis between church and state. 
The year 380 is also symbolical as a starting point of the public (cultural and 
political) meaning and functions of the narratives and myths, dogmas and 
sacred texts of Christianity (II, 83).  
What Christianity (ontologically) is for the participating social actors in a 
particular cultural and political environment, depends on its relations with the 
social classes (Schoenfeld 1992) and on the functions it fulfils in the social 
order (II, 91). Christianity does not have a pre-determined, essentialist, objec-
tive and static attitude and doctrine towards cultural values and political order 
(II, 89). In empirical history, Christianity has had diverse, contested and 
changing relations to politics and culture.  
The middle of the 19th century was another significant turning point in the 
history of Christian politics. In Western Europe, the visible and rapid changes 
of industrialization and urbanization resulted in the first wide-spread move-
ments of self-conscious progressive positivists, secularists and atheists seeking 
after a society without the public functions of the traditional church (Keddie 
2003: 14–15, 18) and aiming to replace previous religious ties with ideological 
bonds.  
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Table 2. Historical periods, phases and patterns identified in five studies 




Historical phases and patterns 
I 380 2000 Two phases of social secularization (‘religious 
secularization’; ‘secular secularization’), starting from  
the social sacralization of Christianity in the 4th 
century 
II 380 1990s Four phases of the secularization of the legitimization 
of the social order, starting from the early Medieval 
pattern of the Christian Universe 
III 16th 
century 
2007 Secularization of the political culture starting from the 
pre-Enlightenment patterns of universal-civilizational 
and confessional-territorial Christian cultures; the role 
of religion in defining the boundaries of cultural 
inclusion and exclusion changed from the church-
defined doctrinal and mythical to the symbolical 
defined by political culture and national community. 
IV Mid-19th 
century 
2000 The historical patterns of the relationship of the 
traditional church to three kinds of political regimes 
(anti-national, Fascist, Communist) 
V Mid-19th 
century 
2007 The historical development of the symbolical 
relationship between Lutheranism and Estonian 
national identity (from negative cultural ‘Other’ to 
positive cultural ‘Us’) 
 
 
In the United States, religious modernization has accompanied the socio-eco-
nomic structural changes. Since the mid-19th century, various forms of (Second) 
religious awakening, innovation (Charismatic Christianity), reaction (Funda-
mentalism) and accommodation have provided groups and communities with 
modern solutions to the modern needs of social life (Gorski, Altinordu 2008: 
75–77).  
In West-European nations, the cultural community of the nation replaced the 
previous religious community of the church. Consequently, in cases where the 
public function of the churches persisted, it changed from the dogmatic and the 
confessional to the civil (Rousseau 1950: 134–135; Ferrari 2010; Hearn 1997) 
and the national.  
At the same time, the national cultural awakening began in the nine post-
communist countries, which constitute the specific focus of study IV and the 
core region of the dissertation.  
In both Western and Eastern Europe, the rise of national and ethnic Chris-
tianity (Storm 2011) accompanied the advance of ideological nationalism in 
cases where traditional churches had a positive tie to the national identity. In 
such cases, the overall public presence of Christianity could remain constant or 
experience a resurgence, but the autonomous influence and direct authority of 
the traditional church declined, because the rise of nationalism resulted in the 
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political emancipation of the state from the church in the realms of political 
legitimacy and cultural socialization (education) (II, 84). 
Correspondingly, while the year 380 symbolized the origin of the direct role 
and influence of the church in the public sphere, the middle of the 19th century 
symbolized the major transformation of the roles and functions of public 
Christianity. This structural change of the 19th century had ideational origins 
already at the end of 17th century (Locke 2003), and during the Age of En-
lightenment, when the relevancy of dogmatic and confessional Christianities for 
political legitimization started to decline.  
The end points of the historical analysis in Studies I and IV depend on the 
use of data from round 1999/2000 of the World Values Surveys. Study V uses 
the same set of comparative data, but extends its historical analysis until the 
parliamentary elections of 2007 in Estonia. The historical end point of Study III 
is enlargement of the European Union to the post-communist East-Central 
Europe (2004–2007). The end point of the historical analysis in Study II is the 
collapse of the South African apartheid regime in the 1990s.  
The historical phases identified in five studies characterize different social, 
cultural and political aspects of the same phenomenon – the changes in the 
types of the publicly functional traditional Christianity. Therefore, to a signi-
ficant extent, the historical phases overlap.  
 
 
Table 3. Comparative analysis in five studies 
Study Units of focus  Units of comparison Purpose 
I Region: (ECE) Regions (ECE and 
West) 
Identifies the regional patterns of 
church authority at the social 
level  
Societies (10 in 
ECE) 
Societies (10 in ECE; 
17 in West) 
Identifies the social patterns of 
church authority at the social 
level 




phases of the patterns 
of political 
legitimization of the 
social order 
(as exemplified by 
racialist policies until 
the mid-19th century) 
Identifies the general historical 
trends of changes in the role and 
scope of traditional church and 
religion in the legitimization of 
the socio-political order in 
societies which did not 







societies (the United 
States, Australia, and 
South Africa)  
Identifies the particular patterns 
of the role and scope of 
traditional church and religion in 
the legitimization of the social 
order (as exemplified by the 
justification of racialist policies 
from mid-19th century until 
1990s) 
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Study Units of focus  Units of comparison Purpose 
III Region (ECE) Regions (Western 
Europe vis-à-vis  post-
communist East-
Central-Europe, 
including the  
orthodox societies 
outside of EU)  
Identifies the changes in the 
political culture and national 
identity that accompany 
modernization; compares the 
‘social belief systems’ of post-
communist and West-European 
societies  











Identifies the historical legacy of 
the relationship (collaboration, 
opposition, non-cooperation) of 
the traditional churches with 
political regimes (anti-national, 
Fascist and Communist) on the 
church religion and religion in 
general (including 
deinstitutionalized and 
individualized forms of 
religiosity)  
V Society: Estonia Societies: institutional 
and non-institutional 
religion in Estonian 
society is compared 
with six traditionally 
Lutheran societies – 
Latvia, Eastern 
Germany, Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and 
Iceland 
Identifies Estonian society as 
having the average level of 
religiosity, but the lowest level of 
church affiliation, among 
traditionally Lutheran cultures of 
Europe; the case study of 
contemporary Estonian politics 
identifies four empirical patterns 
of Lutheran politics  
ECE – East-Central European post-communist Western Christian societies 




The impact of the Communist regime on the social, cultural and political status, 
function and authority of the traditional church is assessed in two ways.  
First, the changes of church authority in the public sphere are analyzed histo-
rically by focusing on its status before and after the Communist regime. All 
studies cover periods before and after Communism. Study II is the only Study 
that does not concentrate on cases from the post-communist region and from the 
Communist period. The utility of this study consists in the outline of the general 
historical trends of changes in the role and scope of traditional church and 
religion in the legitimization of the socio-political order, which serves as 
comparative reference points for the other studies. 
Second, the culturally Western Christian post-communist societies of East-
Central Europe (ECE) are compared with West-European Western Christian 
societies (West) which lack the experiences of modernization under the Com-
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munist regime. The comparisons identify the regional patterns of church 
authority between post-communist and West-European societies, and the social 
patterns of higher and lower levels of church authority. In Study IV, the com-
parison of societies is limited only to post-communist nations.  
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1. SOCIAL AUTHORITY  
Study I compares the social authority of traditional churches in post-communist 
Western Christian societies and in seventeen West-European societies after 
Communism.  
The paper starts with the theoretical outline of the component parts and 
dimensions of church authority at three levels of social life (individual, group 
and society). It maps the historical emergence of particular types of church 
authority in Western societies; the phases of decline of particular types of 
church authority; and the phases of change between the types of church 
authority.  
Secularization is a process that results from modernization (the process of 
urbanization, industrialization, and rising levels of wealth and education) and 
consists in the declining authority of the traditional religious institutions, beliefs 
and values in society, culture and politics (I, 194). Typically, secularization 
occurs in three phases.  
The first phase is the sacralization of Christianity and the Christianization of 
society. The second phase (‘religious modernisation’) is the emancipation (be-
coming autonomous) of the non-religious social spheres (politics, economy, 
science, cultural values and the like) from the previous church authority without 
emancipating from (Christian) religion (I, 203). Eventually, this phase results in 
a shift from universal religious institutions to religious pluralism (I, 199). The 
third phase (‘secular secularization’) is the emancipation of societies, and the 
spheres of social life, from explicit religious beliefs, authorities and institutions 
(I, 200, 201).  
Each phase of secularization brings along a new (ideological or religious, 
explicit or implicit, organizational or informal) ‘system of belief’ (Tschannen 
1991: 401, 408), which is considered by its adherents as sacred as the traditional 
Christian belief system was considered by Christians in traditional Christian 
societies (I, 199). Accordingly, during the third phase the emancipated secular 
societies and spheres of social life tend to sacralize the secular values (i.e. 
values which are not related to an explicit religious institution) of their own. 
Consequently, the secular race, state, nation (Burleigh 2005: 6; Smart 1997), 
economic class (I, 204), work (Bell 1976: 156), consumerism (Baudrillard 1998: 
94), aesthetics, eroticism and science (Weber 1946) can be sacralized either 
culturally or within their sub-cultural sphere of social life. 
The assessment of secularization focuses solely on the authority of the 
traditional church institutions in the public (cultural and political) life, and not 
on the social presence of the sense of sacred, non-institutional religious beliefs 
and practices, and the implicitly religious dimensions of the social, cultural and 
political communities. All manifestations of ‘religion in the public sphere’ and 
religion in society, which are beyond the authoritative control, interpretation 
and representation of the traditional church institutions, are negatively related to 
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the traditional church authority, which used to monopolize authoritatively the 
representation and interpretation of religion in society and politics.  
Not all church institutions are related to social order, but all societies are in 
need of ‘systems of belief’ that sustain moral order and social integration 
(Etzioni 2008; Durkheim 1967). Similarly, political governments need manifest 
rituals and ceremonies, and (implicit or explicit) religious beliefs and symbols, 
which legitimize the social relations of power (Lewellen 1992: 69–81; Haber-
mas 2011: 17).  
Therefore, the appearance of new political forms of religion or the intensi-
fication of the religion-related intra-social confrontations are not signs of rever-
sal to a sacred religious system of social governance or an institutionalization of 
modern version of an organized religious authority (I, 200).  
The religious authority in politics and culture functions effectively when it is 
perceived and experienced to be objective, self-evident and not of human origin 
(Wilson 1979: 278). Accordingly, the authority of the church institution is 
greatest, when it has monopolized the representation and interpretation of 
politically functional religion.  
Modernization, however, tends to pluralize the ‘religious sphere’ (Berger 
2010), which may result in the resurgence of religious vitality (Iannaccone 
1991), but influences negatively the public authority of any particular traditional 
church (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 126).  
The contemporary ‘religion in the public sphere’ is plural and not controlled 
by any particular ideological, religious or political organization. Multiple social 
actors and institutions interpret and represent the contemporary religion – 
among others the church hierarchy, lower clergy, political activists, political 
movements and parties, interest groups and academic scholars (I, 200–201).  
In addition to pluralization, modernization undermines traditional religious 
institutions by individualizing (I, 201), de-institutionalizing (Ter Borg 2004) 
and de-traditionalizing (Boeve 2005) religion.  
An individualized religion lacks the sense of belongingness (Beck 2010) and 
de-institutionalized religion lacks public functions. When religion lacks func-
tional connections to sub-cultural-associational or cultural-political traditions, it 
lacks social validation and has become socially a “toothless” and non-committal 
marketable sentiment (Ter Borg 2008: 133). Accordingly, even traditional reli-
gious beliefs lose their authority, when not validated socially (Tschannen 1991: 
408) either by bonding social capital within a religious association (Putnam 
2000: 65–66) or by cultural norms, customs and socialization. In one way or 
another, the social validation of a religious tradition depends on its institutio-
nalization. 
Thus, social modernization replaces previous, traditional types of Christia-
nity with new (early or late), modern kinds of Christianities. For example, when 
confessional Catholicism and Protestantism replaced universal Catholicism, the 
church authority of the universal Catholicism declined (secularized) and the 
authority of the early modern forms of Christianity increased (sacralized).  
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Empirically, Study I assesses the regional and society-specific patterns of 
social authority of the traditional churches according to six dimensions: reli-
gious affiliation, personal religiosity, religious practice, religious beliefs, 
traditional-religious values and perception of the role and status of the religious 
institution. 
The findings of the study support the ‘secularization due to modernization’ 
thesis – the processes of modernization are accompanied by the decline of the 
social authority of traditional churches – in both West-European and post-
communist regions (I, 221–222). The authority of the traditional church has 
declined and the types of public religion changed due to structural moderni-
zation, and innovations in the means of economic production and communi-
cation (Berger 1969: 109; Bruce 2011: 49; Turner 2007).  
The abovementioned processes of modernization undermine traditional 
church authority by increasing the supremacy of the political and economic 
spheres over the ‘sphere of religion’ in social life (Habermas 2011). During 
modernization, the role of the state consistently increases, and the role of the 
traditional religious institutions decreases. With the advance of market menta-
lity and the scientific worldview, the traditional belief systems either retreat 
(Guth et al 1988: 360) or transform themselves into articles of consumption 
(Turner 1994: 10; Davie 2005). 
According to ‘secularization due to modernization’ thesis, the social 
authority of the traditional church should be lower in socioeconomically more 
developed West-European countries than in post-communist societies (I, 195). 
Several findings of the study confirm this theoretical argument.  
Post-communist societies support more the presence of religious persons in 
politics and the social functions of the traditional churches in issues related to 
morals, family and faith. Their religious beliefs are more traditional and church-
related – beliefs in sin and hell are more widespread in post-communist 
societies – and attitudes regarding family, gender and homosexuality are more 
traditional-religious than in Western European societies (I, 219). In West-Euro-
pean societies, the support of the traditional, institutionalized and hierarchical 
forms of religion, and established religious practices, has declined, while the 
levels of individual religiosity have remained relatively high (I, 201).  
Therefore, the decline of all forms of religion does not accompany moderni-
zation. Instead, the socioeconomic development changes the socially operative 
types of religion. In the realm of sexual relationships, modernization does not 
result in the decline of sex and love, but results in the decline and change of the 
traditional institution of marriage (Ter Borg 2004: 112, 133). Analogically, 
modernization does not result in the decline of religion, but in the decline of the 
traditional church authority. Traditional church institutions may accommodate, 
endorse or resist these cultural changes, but to a significant degree, the values 
and beliefs of the religious institutions develop and change in parallel with the 
general development of social values (II, 83, 88, 89, 93).  
Some of the findings, however, require detailed explanations.  
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First, the average level of religious affiliation is higher in the West than in 
ECE, which means that modernization does not undermine the formal sense of 
belongingness to a religious tradition particularly in cases where the ‘religious 
tradition’ has updated itself with modernity and has not disconnected itself from 
the traditions operative in contemporary society, culture and political com-
munity.  
Second, modernization has not reduced the general religious interest and 
spiritual quest (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 4–5). Instead, modern religion has 
become inclusive. In modernity, the boundaries of a legitimate religion are 
extended and include several forms of spirituality, religiosity, individualized 
Catholicism and Protestantism, ‘Sheilaism’ – “Just my own little voice” (Bellah 
et al 1985: 221) – and pluralism of religious traditions, which in traditional 
European societies were not ranked within the category of legitimate religion. 
The expansion of the boundaries of legitimate religion in modernized societies 
results from the decreasing authority of the previous religious institutions to 
impose a common understanding of religion, and to define authoritatively its 
objective essence, form and boundaries.  
Third, in the post-communist region, the general levels of religiosity (per-
centage of individuals for whom religion is important and who take time for 
prayer) are lower, and the proportions of convinced atheists and those for whom 
“God is not at all important” are higher than in West (I, 195). Paradoxically, 
people in the societies with the most advanced economies are likely to have 
opted out from formal religious affiliation than in economically less-advanced 
post-communist societies.  
Similar to Western democratic and liberal route to modernity, also Com-
munist regimes strived to eliminate traditional Christian authorities from the 
public sphere (to privatize religion), but they did not establish the cultural 
environment, which would favor the development of religious individualization, 
innovation and modernization (I, 199). Therefore, unlike the Western demo-
cratic societies, the Communist social structures did not contribute to the 
individualization and de-traditionalizing of religion (I, 222). 
The results of this study confirm the ‘cultural defense’ thesis, which argues 
that the positive relationship between church and national identity is the main 
reason for the under-secularization in modernized societies (Wallis, Bruce 1992; 
Bruce 2002). In the post-communist region, the social authority of the church 
was preserved most in mono-confessional Catholic societies, where the historic 
religious tradition, national identity and national aspirations have been closely 
connected (I, 196). In this equation, the cultural connection to the national 
identity matters slightly more than type of Christian Confession. 
Confession, however, comes second in explaining the patterns of church 
authority in post-communist societies. According to the ‘socio-historical’ thesis 
of secularization, secularization results from the struggle between social actors 
who promote and others who resist it (Kuru 2007: 590; Chaves 1994: 752; 
Philpott 2009: 185; Gorski 2003: 110, 116–118). The ideological attempt of the 
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Communist regimes to secularize ‘from above’ (Smith 1974: 8) succeeded most 
in Protestant societies, where pre-Communist struggles between church and 
state had already significantly weakened the organizational authority of tradi-
tional churches over their lay members and their secular authority vis-à-vis the 
state.  
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2. LEGITIMIZATION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER 
Study II analyzes the role of Christian churches and beliefs in the political 
legitimization of the social order as exemplified by the legitimization of the 
racialist policies in Western history.  
As mentioned above, some system of beliefs has always legitimized the 
operative social order. Almost in all traditional societies, the social order in-
cluded elements of slavery and racism. Therefore, in late antiquity, when 
Christianity obtained social status and political functions, some existence of 
slavery and racism was a self-evident social reality (II, 81). Naturally, when 
Christianity legitimated the social relations, it legitimated also the socially 
existing forms of racism. 
The paper identifies four historical phases of the religious legitimization of 
the social order. The role and authority of the church institution was greatest 
and the scope of the church-defined religious legitimization was largest in the 
first phase, where the traditional church institution provided political legitimi-
zation by interpreting authoritatively the politically functional Christian myths 
and passages from the sacred script (II, 83). In this phase, Christian norms, 
symbols, dogmas and beliefs functioned as ‘a common language’ and a social 
framework for all members, spheres and institutions of society (I, 202, 205).  
The following phases witnessed the continuous decline of the autonomous 
role of the church and the steady rise of the secular state, although some version 
of (confessional, culturally humanist, national or civilizational) Christianity 
remained instrumental in providing for the political legitimization.  
With the decline of the autonomous role of the church institution and 
church-defined beliefs, the policies of racialism became systematic and 
culminated during the advance of the biological conceptions of race and the 
triumph of colonialism in the 19th century (II, 84–87). In the fourth historical 
phase, the authority of the traditional church was limited to the symbolical 
representation of the – national or civilizational – cultural identity, and the 
social order was justified primarily with beliefs in biological and civilizational 
superiority (as manifested in the superior organization, education, technology, 
warfare, bureaucracy, and manners) (II, 79, 83, 85, 86). 
At one extreme, all non-religious institutions were legitimated by sacred 
script and religious institution (Anderson 2006: 13, 14, 18) and at the other – 
contemporary – extreme, all religious – and later also ideological (Taylor 
2011) – institutions have to translate their reasoning into a common secular 
language (Habermas 2011). 
The influence of a religious institution over the secular governance was 
greatest when the church was autonomous from secular rulers, the state was 
weak and decentralized, the political authority was divided between multiple 
centers of power, and the secular authority of the church institution vis-à-vis 
other centers of secular power was the strongest (I, 202).  
 21
In the modern social, economic and political environment, the secular 
governments do not need the kind of legitimization provided by traditional 
Christian churches for secular governments in a traditional society. The four 
constitutive myths of Christianity (human beings are created by God; humans 
bear God’s image despite their sinful nature; God guides the history of 
humankind; Christ is the only way of salvation) formed the basis of the social 
order of all Western societies until the Age of Enlightenment. For self-inter-
pretation of contemporary societies, however, these Christian myths have 
become irrelevant. (I, 202)   
The comparison of the religious legitimization of the racialist policies in the 
United States, Australia and South Africa provides additional evidence that the 
mid-19th century was a crucial turning point in West-Christian conceptions of 
political identity and political culture. Until the Enlightenment, some version of 
Christianity legitimated all Western social and political orders. Therefore, all 
contests for power were accompanied by conflicts between orthodox and 
heterodox interpretations of the Bible (and Christian tradition), between ortho-
dox and heterodox selections of passages of the Bible, and between orthodox 
and heterodox meanings of the sacred text. The authority of God (including the 
functional social authority ‘over God’) was often contested, but “the impossi-
bility of God's non-existence was a social fact“ (Taylor 2005: 226). 
In the middle of the 19th century, the United States witnessed its last political 
confrontation, where the opposing parties – both religious and political social 
actors – based their (pro- and against slave ownership) arguments on the 
interpretations of the Bible (II, 79, 92, 93).  
By the end of the 20th century, modern conceptions of national Christianity 
have often remained politically operative, but Christian nationalism has ir-
reversibly replaced the church-defined biblical, dogmatic, and mythic Christia-
nity of the previous eras (II, 89). At present, the literal interpretation of the 
Bible has lost its social and political relevancy (II, 88, 93), although the literal 
content of the Bible, which has become freely accessible to anyone, has 
remained the same. It still yields more material for those who seek justifications 
for slavery than for human equality. Today’s readers of the Bible in modernized 
societies of the West, however, believe in human equality, and interpret the 
Bible accordingly (II, 88, 93). They also believe in territorial allegiance and in 
loyalty to a (national) political community over the allegiance to the (religious) 
doctrinal truth and loyalty to a community of believers (III, 16). 
To sum it up, some modern kinds of Christianity may still be functional in 
sacralizing the effective relations of power and providing for political 
legitimacy. Like other contemporary political legitimizations – ideological, 
scientific or Marxist – religious legitimizations have to be oriented towards this-
worldly ends (Burleigh 2005). Accordingly, the traditional church institutions 
fulfill the legitimizing role in politics most likely as symbols of the immanent 
national cultures, not as representatives of the transcendent salvation religions 
(II, 89). 
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The theoretical statement of the symbolical value of a modernized – national, 
cultural or civilizational – Christianity in the legitimization of the social order is 
most valid for the traditionally Protestant cultures. Unlike Protestantism, 
Catholicism has retained several elements – universality, dogmatism, traditio-
nalism, hierarchical structure of church organization, to name a few – that 
characterized churches in their relations with the state and society in traditional 
and early modern societies (Byrnes 2001). 
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3. POLITICAL CULTURE AND  
NATIONAL IDENTITY  
The last three studies focus on the role and status of the traditional churches in 
the cultural and national identity in regional (III) and social (IV) comparison, 
and in the case study of Estonia (V). The organization of studies enables to 
follow the analysis from general to particular and from the historical to the 
contemporary in the way that each subsequent study limits the comparative and 
historical focus, and engages in a deeper empirical analysis. 
 
 
3.1. Post-communist and West-European patterns 
The cultures of Europe can reasonably be termed ‘culturally Christian’ from the 
fourth century to this day. The essence, form and function of the cultural 
Christianity, however, have significantly changed during modernization.  
Study III analyzes the role of the traditional churches and the types of 
Christianity in defining the cultural (civilizational, political and national) 
identity vis-à-vis cultural ‘Others’ from the 16th century (III, 14, 28) until the 
recent wave of the enlargement of EU (2004–2007). Additionally, it compares 
the commonalities and differences of issues related to multiculturalism and 
religion in post-communist and West European societies. 
The cultural ‘Othering’ has been a constant feature of European history. 
Some representative of race, class, ideology or religion has always occupied the 
role of the cultural ‘Other’ (III, 28).  
The historical trend of the changing relationships between the traditional 
church and the political culture resembles the trends in the status and role of the 
traditional church in society (I) and in political legitimization (II). Moderni-
zation does not eliminate religion from culture, but it decreases continuously the 
direct authority of the church and church-defined religion.  
Accordingly, the post-communist societies are less secular and liberal in 
their value orientations, and their conceptions of political nationalism are less 
civic and multicultural than in the economically more advanced societies of 
Western Europe. 
The crucial turning point in Western Europe occurred in the 1960s, when the 
cultures witnessed secularization, liberalization and individualization (III, 17). 
The social ties between individuals and the traditional churches weakened 
(McLeod 2007: 1, 2, 20). The de-Christianization and detraditionalization of the 
social value systems influenced most significantly the institution of marriage, 
the relations of gender (Woodhead 2008: 188) and the norms regulating 
sexuality.  
The cultural pluralization of the 1960s affected not only religious institutions 
and systems of belief, but also political ideologies and parties, secular world-
views and universities. In what has been termed as the age of the ‘end of 
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ideologies’, ‘post-materialist value orientations’, post-industrial or ultramodern 
society, post- or late modernity, authoritative social knowledge is no more 
effectively monopolized by any social institution (Carson 2002: 108). All social 
institutions operate in a situation of plurality, where they cannot impose 
authoritatively their definition of reality, but have to market it (Berger 1969: 
138). Therefore, modernity pluralizes and pluralization relativizes the know-
ledge, beliefs and worldviews of all institutions in the consciousness of 
individuals (Berger 2010: 3, 5).  
In both Eastern and Western Europe, political nationalisms define the social 
belief systems. Since the 1960s, the cultures of West-European societies have 
shifted from principled confrontations between ideologies (capitalism and 
socialism), church and the state, cultural mainstream and cultural minorities, 
towards solutions that demand compromises and accommodations from all 
parties. Correspondingly, there have been shifts from monocultures towards 
multiculturalism, from state churches or radical separations of churches from 
state towards principled distance between state and the church and moderate 
secularism (III, 16–17, 21, 22; Modood 2010).  
Contemporary West-European societies follow secularized and liberal social 
values that emphasize individualism over collective and gender equality over 
traditional values. The ways of life of Western Muslims serve as their defining 
cultural ‘Other’ (III, 34–35).  
The typical post-communist culture is less liberal and individualistic, more 
ordered by ethnic and linguistic identities, and is inclined to define its dominant 
cultural ‘Other’ by references to the historical experience of the Communist rule 
(III, 24, 32).  
The post-communist social belief systems are neither confessional-Christian 
nor atheist despite the legacy of the recent ‘monumental’ confrontation and 
‘zero-sum battle for the beliefs of the citizens’ between Marxism and Chris-
tianity (Janz 1998: 31; Thatcher 2006: 586). Similar to the political cultures of 
Western Europe, the post-communist political cultures have retained con-
nections to cultural Christianity (I, 207–210, 226; III, 32–35), but most of the 
West-European countries have lost the kind of cultural relationship to an 
institutional religion that still exists in post-communist Europe.  
In several West-European countries, where the political nationalism is civic 
(Kuzio 2005: 225), the traditional churches cannot exploit the political role and 
cultural resource of ‘ethnic Christianities’ (Campling 1999: 10; Martin 2005: 32; 
Bruce 2002: 33) the way they can do in post-communist cultures.  
In ‘civic nationalisms’ the churches are expected to distance themselves 
from collective identities (Hann 2000; Walzer 1984). The typical ‘ethnic natio-
nalism’, however, is grounded on both linguistic and ethnic identity, and 
enables the church to represent the cultural community symbolically even in 
cases where the cultural values and national identity are predominantly secular 
(for example, in Estonia).  
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Therefore, the traditional churches in Western Europe can perform their 
cultural roles as ‘vicarious religions’ (Davie 2010), but their connection to 
political identities is significantly weakened in cases where the political natio-
nalism is civic, and significant segments of the population are religious without 
operative ties to church institutions – they “believe without belonging” (Davie 
1994) and “pray alone” (Davie 2002). 
The more advanced secularization of the West-European cultures is manifest 
in the departure from the traditional norms that regulated the institution of 
marriage, the relations of gender and the norms of sexuality. The regional 
difference in social values is greatest in attitudes regarding homosexuality.  
At the turn of the century, homosexuality was disapproved in ECE by 54.5% 
and in West by 26.4% of the respondents, while abortion was disapproved only 
slightly more in ECE than in West (I, 223). The enormous difference in 
attitudes regarding homosexuality is best explained by the legacy of the Com-
munist regimes than by confession or modernization.  
The communist regimes were anti-religious and anti-liberal. Therefore, the 
post-communist societies do not easily approve values which were disapproved 
by Communist regimes (such as homosexuality). They also fight against the 
bans on values that were approved during the Communist time (abortion). 
Accordingly, the legal ban on abortion in post-communist Poland is a particular 
manifestation of church influence (Kilp 2004), because it lacked the cultural 
support of the legacy of the Communist regime.  
The persisting cultural intolerance of homosexuality, however, is not a clear-
cut manifestation of a church authority. The cultural attitudes regarding homo-
sexuality are as conservative in Estonia as they are in Latvia despite the 
enormous difference in levels of religious affiliation – one quarter of the 
population in Estonia is religiously affiliated (half of them Orthodox) and only 
one quarter of the population in Latvia is not religiously affiliated (V, 68). 
Nevertheless, both Estonian and Latvian populations disapprove homosexuality 
significantly more than the Scandinavian societies, where the levels of church 
membership are significantly higher, and levels of religious practice and indivi-
dual religiosity are about as low as in Estonia. Therefore, the persistence of 
traditional conservative attitudes regarding homosexuality in Estonia has less to 
do with church religion (Lutheranism or Orthodox) than with the recent 
experience of the Communist rule. 
 
 
3.2. Legacy of church-state relations  
in post-communist societies 
Study IV tests the ‘secularization due to the historical legacy of church-state 
relations’ hypothesis, which argues that the political failure of the clerical 
regimes determines most the decline of religious authority of the church 
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(Iannaccone 1991: 162; Tocqueville 1851: 315; Tocqueville 1899: 334; Casa-
nova 1994: 29).  
The sample of traditionally Western Christian post-communist societies – 
Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia – offers a good opportunity to elaborate this thesis by 
comparing the legacies of clerical relationships with three kinds of political 
regimes – antinational, Fascist and Communist – on church religion (and on 
religiosity in general).  
The study argues that the historical alliance with a failed regime does not 
result in uniformly negative consequences for the church and religion. Close 
collaboration between the church and the anti-national regime at the beginning 
of the national awakening (during the 19th century) has influenced significantly 
more the present status of the church and religion than the connections of the 
church to other politically failed – the Communist or Fascist – regimes (IV, 
234).  
Particularly, the positive connection to the Fascist regime has not resulted in 
long-term negative legacies (IV, 237, 240, 242). Fascism failed as a political 
regime, but it represents the radicalized version of nationalism, which has 
neither failed as an idea nor been defeated as a regime. Additionally, the histo-
rical clerical-fascisms have served as examples of close relations between the 
church and the national identity (IV, 242). Therefore, in comparison to 
Absolutism and Communism, which failed as ideas and as regimes, the collabo-
ration with the Fascist regimes had a negative impact for the church only for 
immediate decades after the Second World War.  
The study of nine post-communist countries emphasizes the legacy of the 
historical connection of the church to the anti-national regime, which has been 
absent in all countries – Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, and Lithuania – which at 
present have high levels of both church religion and general religiosity. In 
countries with low level of both church religion and general religion – Estonia, 
Latvia, and the Czech Republic – the church has sided with anti-national politi-
cal forces during the early nation-building processes. (IV, 237, 240; V, 68–69) 
This observation explains the patterns of cultural under- and over-seculari-
zation in both Eastern and Western Europe (Ireland, Poland vs France, the 
Czech Republic). The connection between the nation and the church becomes 
stronger, when the following conditions are fulfilled: nation-building takes 
place without independent statehood for an extended period of time; the 
political opponent of the nation follows a contrasting ideology or religion; the 
nations lack historical experience of the pluralist democratic politics; the type of 
political nationalism is ethnic (not civic); and the level of socioeconomic 
development is not high (Norris, Inglehart 2004).  
The clerical connection to regime, however, explains why in certain cases 
religious modernization has not accompanied social and political modernization. 
The historical emergence of movements, parties and states devoted to 
‘assertive’ secularism (Kuru 2007: 571, 590; Ferrari 2010: 752) and principled 
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atheism cannot be explained without references to widespread anticlerical 
reactions to the previous clerical political regimes (Taylor 2002: 7). 
The historical tie between the church and the nation is of particular impor-
tance in the nine societies of this study, because they all have been historically 
part of multinational empires and their nation-states are peripheral and of late 
formation. They situate at the cultural borderlands between Eastern and Western 
Christianity. Unlike to Western Europe, their political nationalisms have laid 
strong emphasis on cultural, linguistic and religious elements, which were 
intensified by reactions to the Communist state secularism (IV, 232–233; I, 
226–227). 
Correspondingly, the policy of religion (and of church traditions) of Com-
munist regimes was highly sensitive to the existing type of connection between 
nation and the church (Ramet 1987: 13). Regardless whether the pattern of 
Communist policy vis-à-vis the church was co-optative or repressive, the Com-
munist period tended to weaken the pre-existing weak bonds between the 
church and the nation (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany), and to 
strengthen them where they were strong from the beginning (Croatia, Lithuania, 
Poland).  
Therefore, for the present status of church authority and church religion in 
the post-communist region of the traditionally Western Christian societies, the 
cultural connection to national identity is a more important determinant than the 
nature of the church’s relations with the Communist regime. 
 
 
3.3. Confessional pattern: the case of Lutheran Estonia 
The confessional differences between Catholicism and Lutheranism have been 
relevant in all five studies. In traditionally Protestant societies, the social 
authority of the church is the weakest, the religious legitimization of politics is 
most de-traditionalized, and the impact of the Communist period on church 
religion the worst (I, 227; IV, 237; V, 68). 
Modernization does not need to decrease the levels of church membership in 
Lutheran societies (Scandinavia), yet every Lutheran church in post-communist 
societies has suffered a drastic decline in the levels of church affiliation.  
Some of the reasons why Communist regimes succeeded in alienating the 
Lutheran populations from their church tradition exist in the confessional 
particularities of Lutheranism. In comparison to Catholicism, Lutheranism is a 
form of an individualized Christianity (I, 204); is based more on an individual 
belief and less on collective religious practice (Hervieu-Léger 1998: 29); and 
has been supportive to the ‘religious quest’ in nonreligious spheres of life 
(Weber 1958).  
Additionally, Lutheranism has been one of the main historical carriers of 
secularization (Martin 2005), which weakened the church authority and its auto-
nomy from the state long before Communism. Lutheranism’s organizational 
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authority over its members and its status vis-à-vis any kind of political re-
gimes – including the Communist states – has been weaker than the organi-
zational authority and political autonomy of the Catholic Church.  
The case study of the patterns of Lutheran politics in Estonia, however, iden-
tifies four types of Lutheran politics (V, 70–73) still operative in the culture, 
which is most alienated from an organized Christianity in the whole of Europe.  
The most significant functions of the Lutheran church in Estonian politics 
are related to ‘civil religion’ and cultural nationalism. Both represent the types 
of church involvement in national politics which are least defined by church 
tradition and church institution (V, 68, 70, 74), yet are the most functional ones 
within the context of contemporary post-communist and ethnic nationalisms. 
The presence of church-defined norms and values within the political processes, 
however, would transform it from an institution of a political culture into one of 
multiple interest groups within a civil society. 
Identification with Lutheranism as a national culture or its symbol, however, 
differs from identification with Lutheranism as a church religion (V, 69–70). 
While the patriotic sentiments can lead every Estonian to identify with the 




In Western Christian history, the declining authority of the traditional church 
institutions in society, culture and politics is the sole indicator of the social, 
cultural and political secularization that accompanies the processes of moderni-
zation. 
Societies secularize by abandoning the traditional religious beliefs, values, 
loyalties and institutional practices, while the aggregate whole – traditional and 
modern, institutional and non-institutional – forms of religion may remain 
constant.  
The secularization of social values manifests itself primarily in the departure 
from the traditional (church-defined) norms that regulated the institution of 
marriage, the relations of gender and the norms of sexuality. 
Political cultures become autonomous from traditional religious institutions 
(secularize) and replace the traditional Christian social belief systems with 
modern systems of social belief. In traditional societies, church tradition and 
church institution defined the publicly functional religion. In modernized 
societies, the churches maintain political functions by providing symbols for the 
values, identities and beliefs defined by modern cultural and political com-
munities that have been emancipated from the traditional authority of the 
religious institutions.  
According to the West-European pattern, polities secularize by establishing a 
distance between church and state (moderate secularism) but preserve the 
(symbolical) public presence of modern types of political Christianity (civil 
religion, cultural Christianity). 
The secularization and change of publicly functional Christianities in Euro-
pean societies has been dependent on the level of socioeconomic and political 
development.  
Economic industrialization (and post-industrialization) and the development 
of free market economies has been historically instrumental for all turning 
points of secularization – the 16th century, the mid-19th century, and the 1960s.  
The economically more advanced West-European nations have distanced 
themselves from traditional forms of church authority more than the post-
communist countries. Accordingly, the level of economic modernization 
matters in explaining the reason, why traditional Christian churches have lost 
their traditional public functions in both post-communist and West-European 
traditionally Western Christian societies.  
By the middle of the 19th century, the publicly functional Christianities in 
West-European societies had transformed from the biblical and dogmatic, 
mythic and confessional to the cultural, civil and the national. The cultural 
nation-building in the traditionally Western Christian post-communist societies 
started at the time when the period of the politically functional church-defined 
Christianity had ended and a significant secularization of societies, polities and 
political cultures had occurred in all European cultures.  
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Therefore, the concurrent experience of the transition from the agrarian to 
industrial modes of economic production explains the regional similarities. The 
variations in the level of political modernization, however, help to explain the 
regional variations.  
In Western Europe, for about a millennium the decline of the authority of the 
church institution has been dependent on the simultaneous rise of the secular 
governments. In post-communist Western Christian societies, for an extended 
period, political nationalism developed without an independent nationhood and 
magnified the role of the ethnic, cultural and religious elements within the 
national political culture. 
The Communist period has influenced the patterns of church authority 
within a framework of a socio-historical path-dependence. The outcome of the 
following two pre-Communist struggles between the church and the state has 
influenced the status of church authority after Communism more than the 
specific nature of church-state relations during the Communist period.  
First, the historical struggles between Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
resulted in the political division of Western Christianity into confessional 
Catholicism and Protestantism. Thereafter, the organizational authority of 
Lutheran churches over their lay members and their secular authority vis-à-vis 
the states have been significantly weaker than the organizational and political 
authority of the Catholic churches. Accordingly, the Communist regimes 
succeeded in undermining the public presence, status and authority of all 
traditional Lutheran churches. In traditionally Catholic societies, however, they 
succeeded only in cases where the connection of the church to the national 
identity was negative from the start (the Czech Republic). 
Second, the legacy of church-state relationships during the early national 
awakening in 19th century has influenced the social status of the traditional 
churches more than the relationships of these churches with the Communist or 
Fascist regimes. Regardless of whether the pattern of Communist policy vis-à-
vis the church was co-optive or repressive, the Communist period tended to 
weaken the pre-existing weak bonds between the church and the nation 
(Estonia, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany) but to strengthen them where 
they were strong from the beginning (Croatia, Lithuania, Poland). 
Within the region of post-communist Western Christian societies, the social 
authority of the church was preserved most in mono-confessional Catholic 
societies, where the historic religious tradition, national identity and national 
aspirations have been closely connected.  
In two indirect and unintended ways, however, the Communist regimes 
helped to conserve the traditions of church institutions and their values in 
society. 
First, the social structures of the Communist regimes protected the traditio-
nal churches from religious individualization, innovation and modernization, 
which have weakened the church authority in Western liberal democratic 
societies.  
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Second, the anti-religious and anti-liberal value orientation of the Com-
munist regimes contributed to the persistence of specific church-related 
traditional social value orientations (disapproval of homosexuality), which have 
remained strong, even in those post-communist societies where the connections 
to the traditional churches have largely been lost. 
How much can we generalize? 
In generalizing the findings of the dissertation, it must be kept in mind that 
the historically Western-Christian post-communist countries have only recently 
reached the economic (free market) and political structures (independent nation-
states, democratic and pluralist cultures) which tend to undermine the public 
functions of the traditional churches. In societies with traditional modes of 
economic production and with systems of political government which are either 
new, weak or functionally absent, the provision of the traditional kinds of 
cultural, political and social functions by traditional types of religious 
authorities is expected. The decline of traditional religious authority depends on 
the level of economical, social and political development. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN  
Kiriku võim ühiskonnas, kultuuris ja  
poliitikas peale kommunismi 
Sekulariseerumisteooria kohaselt toob kaasajastumine kaasa traditsiooniliste 
kirikute võimu languse ühiskonnas, kultuuris ja poliitikas. Et doktoritöö kesken-
dub ainult traditsiooniliste kirikute avalikule võimule, on traditsioonilise kirik-
liku institutsiooni võimu langus avalikul alal ainus (ja määrav) kaasajastu-
misega kaasneva sekulariseerumise tunnus.  
Valgustusaja eelse olukorraga võrreldes on traditsiooniliste kirikute võim 
vähenenud nii postkommunistlikus kui ka Lääne-Euroopas. Doktoritöö läbivaks 
uurimusküsimuseks on: „Millist spetsiifilist mõju kiriku võimu vähenemisele ja 
muutusele avaldasid ateistlikud kommunistlikud režiimid?“ 
Töö regionaalne põhifookus on postkommunistlikel läänekristliku kultuuri-
traditsiooniga ühiskondadel, mida võrreldakse sotsiaalmajanduslikult kõrgemalt 
arenenud Lääne-Euroopa ühiskondadega, kus teoreetiliste lähte-eelduste koha-
selt peaks kiriklik võim olema väiksem.  
Uurimus teostatakse ajalooliselt ja võrdlevalt. Kiriku võimu analüüsitakse 
kommunistliku režiimi eelsel, aegsel ja järgsel ajal. Läänekristliku kultuuri-
traditsiooniga postkommunistlikke ühiskondi võrreldakse Lääne-Euroopa lääne-
kristlike ühiskondadega nii regionaalselt kui ka ühiskonniti. 
Uurimused lähenevad kiriku võimu langusele ja muutusele erinevate, kuid 
üksteist mitte välistavate, tahkude alt.  
I uurimus käsitleb sotsiaalset sekulariseerumist kahes faasis – usulises 
(kristlikus) ja sekulaarses sekulariseerumises. Usulise sekulariseerumise puhul 
mitte-usulised ühiskondlikud sfäärid (poliitika, majandus jt) ja institutsioonid 
(riik) iseseisvuvad varasemast kiriklikust võimust usuliselt (kristlikult). Seku-
laarse sekulariseerumise faasis ühiskonnad ja ühiskonnaosad emantsipeeruvad 
traditsioonilistest kristlikest uskumustest, usupraktikatest ja institutsionaalsest 
usulisest võimust sekulaarselt ehk sakraliseerides omi identiteete (rassi, rah-
vust), institutsioone (klassi, riiki) ja väärtusi (tööd, tarbimist, valikuvabadust). 
Traditsiooniliste kirikute sotsiaalne võim on muutunud ja langenud Lääne-
Euroopas rohkem kui postkommunistlikus regioonis, kus elanikkonnad toetavad 
rohkem traditsiooniliste kirikute sotsiaalseid funktsioone ja traditsioonilisi 
sotsiaalseid väärtusi.  
Ehkki Lääne-Euroopa ühiskondade liikmed on rohkem hüljanud traditsioo-
nilisi usupraktikaid, uskumusi ja kiriklikku võimu, ei ole ühiskondlik kaas-
ajastumine vähendanud neis individuaalset usklikkust, usulist huvi ja formaalset 
usutraditsiooni kuuluvuse tunnet. Tänases Lääne-Euroopas on legitiimse reli-
giooni piirid avardunud, hõlmates individuaalset usklikkust, uskumusi ja usu-
ühenduste vorme, mida traditsioonilistes Euroopa ühiskondades legitiimse reli-
giooni hulka ei liigitatud. Traditsiooniline kiriku võim avalikul alal on vähene-
nud ka kommunistlike režiimide tulemina, kuid viimased ei ole soodustanud 
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usulist individualiseerumist, innovatsiooni ja kaasajastumist võimaldava kultuu-
rilise keskkonna tekkimist. 
Kiriku sotsiaalse võimu variatsioone postkommunistlikus regioonis selgi-
tavad kaks peamist tunnust – side kiriku ja rahvusidentiteedi vahel ning kristlik 
konfessioon (luterlus või katoliiklus). Kiriku ühiskondlik võim on säilinud kõige 
enam katoliiklikes ühiskondades, mille ajalooline usutraditsioon, rahvus-
identiteet ja rahvuslikud püüdlused on olnud tihedalt seotud. Kommunistlike 
režiimide sekulariseerimise katset saatis suurim edu luterlikes ühiskondades, 
kus kommunismieelsed võitlused riigi ja kiriku vahel olid nõrgendanud tradit-
siooniliste kirikute organisatsioonilist võimu oma liikmeskonna üle ning kiriku 
sekulaarset võimu avalikul alal. 
II uurimus analüüsib poliitilise legitiimsuse sekulariseerumist, eristades 
rassistlike poliitikate näitel nelja ajaloolist faasi, mille käigus kiriku institut-
siooni ja kristlike uskumuste roll sotsiaalpoliitilise korra legitimiseerijatena on 
vähenenud. Esimeses faasis olid kiriku institutsiooni võim ja kiriku poolt 
määratletud usuline legitiimsus suurimad, kuna kiriku institutsioon tõlgendas 
autoriteetselt kristlikke norme, müüte, sümboleid ja pühakirja osi, mis toimisid 
jagatud „keele“ ja sotsiaalse raamistikuna kõigi ühiskonna liikmete, sfääride ja 
institutsioonide jaoks. 
Järgnenud faasides kiriku institutsiooni roll poliitilise legitiimsuse tagamisel 
vähenes vastavalt sellele, kuivõrd tugevnes sekulaarne riik ning kaasajastus 
majanduslik tootmine. Ehkki mingi versioon (konfessionaalsest, kultuurilisest, 
rahvuslikust, tsivilisatsioonilisest) kristlusest jäi poliitilise legitiimsuse taga-
misel instrumentaalseks ka viimases faasis, piirdus traditsioonilise kiriku võim 
selles sümboolse kultuuriidentiteedi esindamisega. 19. sajandi keskpaigast 
alates on rahvus- ja kultuurkristluse vormid vahetanud poliitilise legitiimsuse 
tagamise rollis lõplikult välja varasemad piibellikud, dogmaatilised ja müüti-
lised lunastuskristlused.  
III uurimus vaatleb poliitilise kultuuri sekulariseerumise ajaloolisi arengu-
faase ning ühiskondlikele ja regionaalseid mustreid postkommunistlikes ja 
Lääne-Euroopa riikides. 
Ehkki alates neljandast sajandist saab Euroopa ühiskondi pidada kultuuri-
liselt kristlikeks, on vastava kultuurkristluse sisu, vorm ja funktsioon kaas-
ajastumise käigus muutunud analoogiliselt kiriku sotsiaalsele võimule ja rollile 
poliitilise legitiimsuse tagamisel. Kaasajastumine pole kõrvaldanud kirikut 
avalikult alalt, küll aga on järjepidevalt vähendanud kiriku institutsiooni ja 
kiriku-defineeritud religiooni otsest võimu. 
1960ndatel aastatel leidis Lääne-Euroopa ühiskondades aset murranguline 
ühiskondlike väärtushoiakute sekulariseerumine. Inimeste sidemed traditsioo-
niliste kirikute, kiriku õpetuste ja kollektiivsete usupraktikatega nõrgenesid ning 
lagunesid varasemad abielu institutsiooni, sugude vahelisi suhteid ja seksuaal-
suhteid reguleerinud jagatud normid. 
Postkommunistlike ühiskondade uskumused ja väärtushoiakud ei ole ei ateist-
likud ega ka konfessionaalsed-kiriklikud. Ka postkommunistlikud kultuurid on 
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säilitanud sidemed kultuurilise kristlusega, kuid tüüpiline postkommunistlik 
kultuur on Lääne-Euroopa omast vähem liberaalne ja individualistlik ning enam 
korraldatud etnilis-keeleliste identiteetide järgi. Piirkonnas levinud etniline 
natsionalism võimaldab kirikul esindada kultuurkogukonda sümboolselt ka 
juhtudel, kui kultuurilised väärtused ja rahvusidentiteet on valdavalt sekulaarsed 
(nt Eestis).  
IV uurimus analüüsib, kuidas on kiriku võimu vähenemisele kaasa aidanud 
kiriku klerikaalsed sidemed poliitiliselt ebaõnnestunud režiimidega. 
Uurimusest selgub, et tihe seos rahvusliikumise vastase režiimiga 19. sajan-
dil on mõjutanud kiriku ja religiooni staatust ühiskonnas rohkem kui sidemed 
teiste poliitiliselt ebaõnnestunud – kommunistliku või fašistliku – režiimiga. 
Kõigis ühiskondades, kus kirikliku religiooni näitajad on endiselt kõrged – 
Poolas, Slovakkias, Horvaatias ja Leedus – puudub kirikutel ajalooline side 
rahvusliikumisevastase režiimiga. Kõigis ühiskondades, kus kirikliku religiooni 
tase täna on madal – Eesti, Läti ja Tšehhi Vabariik – on kirik olnud rahvus-
liikumise alguperioodil rahvusliikumise vastaste poliitiliste jõudude poolel.  
Uurimuse leid aitab selgitada kultuurilise sekulariseerumise mustreid nii 
Lääne- kui Ida-Euroopas, kuid on üheksa postkommunistliku ühiskonna seas 
märksa olulisema kaaluga, kuna viimastes on kiriku ja religiooni osa kultuu-
rilises rahvusidentiteedis võimendanud pikaajaline rahvusluse areng ilma polii-
tilise omariikluseta ning ka kommunistliku režiimi periood. Sõltumata sellest, 
kas kommunistlik poliitika kiriku suhtes oli repressiivne või kaasav, kom-
munistliku režiimi periood kaldus nõrgendama eelnevaid nõrku sidemeid 
rahvuse ja kiriku vahel (Eesti, Tšehhi Vabariik, Ida-Saksamaa) ning tugevdama 
sidemeid, mis olid tugevad juba enne kommunismi (Horvaatia, Leedu, Poola). 
V uurimus tuvastab nelja liiki luterlikku poliitikat Eesti kultuuris, mille 
liikmed on traditsioonilistest kristlikest institutsioonidest tänases Euroopas 
kõige enam võõrandunud.  
Kõige tähtsamad luteri kiriku funktsioonid poliitikas on seotud tsiviil-
religiooni ja kultuurilise rahvuslusega. Mõlema puhul on tegemist sellise kiriku 
osalusega poliitikas, mis on kõige vähem defineeritud kiriku traditsiooni ja insti-
tutsiooni poolt, ent on kõige funktsionaalsem kaasaja postkommunistlike etni-
liste natsionalismide kontekstis. Taas on oluline side poliitilise kultuuriga – kui 
luteri kiriku kui institutsiooniga (kodanikuühiskonnas toimiva huvigrupiga) 
samastub umbes iga viies eestlane, siis luterluse kui rahvuskultuuri sümboliga 
saavad samastuda kõik patriootilisi tundeid omavad eestlased. 
Viie uurimuse kokkuvõttes saab järeldada, et kommunistliku perioodi mõju 
kiriklikule võimule on toimunud ajaloolises rajasõltuvuses (path dependency). 
Kaks kommunismi-eelset riigi ja kiriku vahelist võitlust  – Reformatsiooni-
ajastust tulenev jagunemine katoliiklikeks ja luterlikeks kultuuritraditsioonideks 
ning kiriku sidemed rahvusliikumisega 19. sajandil – on mõjutanud kiriku 
võimu peale kommunismi rohkem kui kommunismi-aegsete riigi ja kirikute 
suhete loomus. 
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Kaudselt, ehkki soovimatult, on kommunistlikud režiimid aidanud ka säili-
tada kiriku traditsioone ja väärtusi ühiskonnas. Kommunistliku režiimi sotsiaal-
sed struktuurid kaitsesid usutraditsioone kaasajastumise ja individualiseerumise 
eest ning kommunistlikele režiimidele omane illiberaalne ühiskondlike väär-
tuste süsteem on aidanud säilitada traditsioonilisi väärtushoiakuid (homoseksua-
lismi taunimine) isegi ühiskondades, milles valdav enamus inimestest on 
tänaseks kaotanud sidemed traditsiooniliste kirikutega.  
Tulemuste üldistamisel tuleb meeles pidada, et läänekristliku kultuuri-
taustaga postkommunistlikud ühiskonnad on alles hiljuti jõudnud traditsiooni-
liste kirikute avalikke funktsioone nõrgendavate majanduslike (vaba turg) ja 
poliitiliste (iseseisev rahvusriik, demokraatlik ja pluralistlik kultuur) struktuu-
rideni. Ühiskondades, mille majandusliku tootmise viis on traditsiooniline ning 
poliitilise valitsemise traditsioon kas uus, nõrk või olematu, on oodatav, et usu-
traditsioonid ja usulised institutsioonid täidavad traditsioonilisi ühiskondlikke, 
kultuurilisi ja poliitilisi funktsioone. 
Traditsioonilise usulise võimu langus sõltub majandusliku, ühiskondliku ja 
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